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VOLUME 32 SUMMER, 1957 NUMBER 2
WASHINGTON CASE LAW- 1956
Presented below is the fourth annual Survey of Washington Case
Law. The value of such a survey is attested by the increasing number
of publications which publish similar surveys dealing with the case law
of their respective jurisdictions. The articles appearing herein have
been prepared by second year student invitees to the Law Review as a
part of their program for nomination to the Editorial Board. The sec-
ond year students were guided in their work by third year student
members of the Editorial Board and by various members of the faculty
of the Law School.
The survey does not represent an attempt to discuss every Washing-
ton case decided in 1956. Rather, its purpose is to point out those cases
which, in the opinion of the Editorial Board, constitute substantial
additions to the body of law in Washington. The second survey which
is published by the Washington Law Review, that dealing with signifi-
cant new legislation, will appear in the forthcoming Autumn issue.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Scope of Review. In Williams v. Hollenbeck,' the decision of the
State Department of Public Assistance was reversed without discus-
sion of the scope of judicial review of administrative action. Disposi-
tion of the case in this fashion reinforces the concept that while admin-
istrative findings of fact made after a fair hearing are final unless
unsupported by the evidence, no deference need be given administra-
tive interpretations of the law. Upon questions of law the Court
exercises an independent judgment and enforces its views of policy
unrestrained by the contrary views of the administrative agency
charged with enforcement of the law.
1 149 Vash. Dec. 27, 297 P2d 952 (1956).
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The Williams had been recipients of general assistance payments
from the State of Washington continuously since 1953. In July of
1954, to forestall suit on debts they had contracted prior to becoming
welfare recipients, they executed a note secured by a mortgage on
their exempt furniture and realty. The county office of the Depart-
ment of Public Assistance notified the Williams that delivery of the
mortgage constituted a prohibited transfer within the meaning of
RCW 74.08.335 and certain departmental regulations.' Since under
the statute and rulings this would render them ineligible for public
assistance for a period of time during which the reasonable value of
the property transferred would be adequate to meet their needs, the
recipients requested a hearing by the state director. This resulted in
a general affirmation of the county office ruling and the Williams
appealed to the Superior Court, where the state director was reversed.'
The statutory prohibition of transfers serves at least three pur-
poses: (1) it prevents persons from making themselves eligible for
public assistance by giving away their property, (2) it requires a
person who disposes of property by gift or sale to "live up" the pro-
ceeds before receiving further state aid, and (3) it preserves the state's
lien against the recipient's exempt resources upon his death and thus
increases the possibility that there will be a partial recovery of assist-
ance payments.' The supreme court, in affirming the lower court's
2 RCW 74.08.335 provides, "Public assistance shall not be granted under chapters
74.04 through 74.16 to any person who has made an assignment or transfer of property
for the purpose of rendering himself eligible for assistance under chapters 74.04
through 74.16. Any person who shall have transferred or shall transfer any real or
personal property or any interest in property within two years of the date of application
for public assistance without receiving adequate monetary compensation therefor, or
any person who after becoming a recipient transfers any property or any interest in
property without the consent of the director, shall be ineligible for public assistance
for a period of time during which the reasonable value of the property so transferred
would have been adequate to meet his needs under normal conditions of living: Pro-
sided, That the director is hereby authorized to allow exceptions in cases where undue
hardship would result from a denial of assistance." (1953 c. 174 #33.)
Regulation 441.14-R provides: "Transfers shall mean an act or omission to act
whereby title to or any interest in property is assigned, set over or otherwise vested
or allowed to vest in another person; including delivery of personal property, bills
of sale, deeds, mortgages, pledges .... .
Regulation 411.148-R(6) provides: "...If a recipient executes and delivers a
mortgage covering exempt property, the delivery of the mortgage shall be considered
the transfer of the property; ... "
a RCW 74.08.080. Federal statutes in many instances provide that federal pensions
are a "bounty" and that the decision of the administrator shall be final and unappeal-
able. 54 Stat. 1197 (1940), 38 U.S.C. § 11a-2 (1946) ; 48 State 9 (1933), 38 U.S.C. 705(1946). The Washington statute provides that a recipient may appeal whenever he
feels aggrieved and has exhausted his available administrative remedies. The scope of
review is limited by a provision in the statute that the court shall not disturb the
findings of fact unless the evidence in the record preponderates against them, nor
reverse a ruling unless it is found to be arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
4 The provisions of RCW 74.08.111 give the State, in certain specified circum-
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reversal of the state director, stated that the statute was clearly not
intended to prohibit "a mortgage of exempt resources by welfare
recipients to secure antecedent debts, the consideration for which is
the forbearance of suit by the mortgagee."' In short, while the depart-
ment regulations may be valid generally in defining a mortgage to be
a "transfer," they do not extend the intent of the legislature to pro-
scribe a transfer to these particular circumstances.
The issue was not forcefully presented in the brief filed in behalf
of the State Department of Public Assistance, but it may be noted
that this decision does not serve the third imputed purpose of the
statute; i.e., the preservation of the state's right to recover welfare
payments out of the estate of the recipient. The lack of either a
fraudulent attempt to qualify for benefits or any present monetary
or property consideration which the recipient can "live up" is the
point of distinction made by the court.
The prior case of Robinson v. Olzendam involved the same depart-
ment of the state government and the court was likewise faced with
the problem of reviewing an administrative determination as to how
best to implement the purpose of a statute. There the question was
what standard to use to determine the amount to be deducted from
assistance payments as a credit for imputed income from home owner-
ship. The agency had been using a "minimum" figure of six dollars
for all recipients in a particular county and changed to the "median,"
or thirteen dollars. A considerable amount of evidence developing
the statistical analysis and policy considerations used by the depart-
ment was entered in the record. The court upheld the department's
ruling, stating,
"Even if the department was in error in its determination, it exercised
its honest judgment in this matter and, therefore, the trial court should
not have held that the department acted arbitrarily, capriciously or
upon a fundamentally wrong basis in these cases."7 (italics supplied.)
stances, a right to assert a lien up to the amount paid in public assistance against the
estate of deceased recipients of public assistance superior to that of all unsecured
creditors. It should be noted that the debts of the recipients in the Williams case
were subject to this "creditor" right of the state prior to the mortgage, but not after.
The court may have discounted this as inconsequential in general and dependent chil-
dren assistance cases as opposed to old age assistance cases, but is this a valid distinc-
tion? The State's lien is applicable to both classes of assistance and as a practical mat-
ter, except for the statute of limitation, the department's chances of recovering would
appear to be equal.
5 297 P.2d at 954.
6 Robinson v. Olzendam, 38 Wn.2d 30, 227 P.2d 732 (1951).
7 227 P.2d at 737.
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Contrast that statement with the court's terse comment in the Wil-
liams case, "We do not agree with the department's position on the
matter."'
Although both decisions may be sound, the apparent conflict is
obvious and sharp. Their reconciliation may give some insight as
to the basis upon which the court will review administrative determina-
tions. This involves the "law-fact" distinction and also some practical
policy considerations inherent in the problem of substituted judicial
judgment.
While left unsaid, it is clear that the court treated the question of
whether the Williams "transferred" an "interest in property" as one
of law. In the Robinson case, the court stated that there was room
for a difference of opinion as to whether the minimum figure or the
median was more accurate, and it regarded this to be a question of
fact. The statute prescribing the scope of judicial review of decisions
of the Department of Public Assistance states that the court shall not
disturb the findings of fact unless the evidence in the record prepon-
derates against them, nor reverse a ruling unless it is found to be
arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.' Thus the court is entirely
free of any restraint as to a question deemed to be one of law, but its
power to reverse upon the facts is limited to those cases where the
action is found to be arbitrary or clearly unsupported by the evidence.
This statutory prescription coincides with the position taken by the
court as to the scope of its review of administrative decisions gener-
ally." But this distinction between law and fact is too neat-the ques-
tion of the interpretation to be placed upon the statutory requirement
of income credits in the Robinson case is at least partially one of law."
It may logically be urged that whether the Williams "transferred" an
"interest in property" is in the final analysis a question of fact.' 2 Other
factors must be weighed in the balance with such fine distinctions if
8297 P.2d at 954.
9 RCW 74.08.080.
'1 re St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wn2d 580, 110 P.2d 877 (1941) ; In re
Stolting, 131 Wash. 392, 230 Pac. 205 (1924).
u Compare NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944), where the issue
was whether the term "employees" in the National Labor Relations Act encompassed
newsboys selling appellants' papers. The Court met squarely the argument of appel-
lants that the term should be applied as it was at common law, stating that the meaning
of the word was to be found in the history, terms and purposes of the statute, but lim-
ited its review to a determination that the findings of the board had "warrant in the
record" and a "reasonable basis in law." The court thus met the fundamental issue
of law raised on appeal, but left to the discretion of the agency the specific application
of the language within the limits it outlined.
12 THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE N EvIDExcE 249-50 (1898).
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judicial review is not to be in itself an arbitrary and capricious action.
A further basis for distinguishing the results in the two cases may
be found in the legislative function which the departmental rulings
served in each case. In the Williams case, the regulation merely
defined a term of the statute. By contrast the ruling attacked in the
Robinson case was pursuant to a legislative delegation of authority
to determine the consideration to be given to imputed income from
resources of the recipient. The statute prescribed that such considera-
tion must be given but gave no formula for evaluating the resource and
provided that the department make such rules and regulations as were
required. 3 It is submitted that the court will generally give a much
higher standing to a regulation promulgated in the exercise of dele-
gated authority necessary to the carrying out of the legislative intent
than they will to an agency definition of a statute's meaning, a func-
tion traditionally judicial in nature. The court could find that the
definitive regulation in the Williams case extended the statute to cases
not properly within its scope, but a regulation exercising a delegated
discretion within the limits of the delegation is not open to such an
attack.
The attitude the courts will take as to the limits of their reviewing
function will be influenced in part by their practical appraisal of the
abilities of the agency as opposed to the court as a tribunal to decide
the particular issue raised.'* Thus in the two cases under discussion,
a distinction may be drawn as to the value of expertise in deciding
them. The determination in the Robinson case of whether the mini-
mum or median figure was the more accurate in the greater number
of cases was one requiring statistical analysis and experience which
the department was particularly qualified to make. On the other
hand, nothing could be more within the armory of the courts' peculiar
abilities than determining the proper interpretation of statutory
wording. 5 Other practical considerations not present in a comparison
"3 Ren. Supp. 1949, sections 9998-33q, 9998-33c and 9998-33j.
The regulations held inapplicable in the Williams case were issued under the same
statute as those in the Robinson case. It provides generally for the promulgation and
publication of such regulations as the director shall deem necessary. The difference
in the court's treatment results from the fact that, in the Robinson case, the legislation
provided that something bad to be done and was silent as to the details, leading undeni-
ably to the inference raised by the court-that the director was expected to fill in those
details and that the statute was intended to delegate the specific legislative authority
necessary.
1 For an acute discussion of the federal cases, see DAvis, AD NIsTRATIvE LAw,
c. 20 (2d ed. 1951), and Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of
Statutes, 3 VAND. L. Rxv. 470 (1950).
15 However, the experience of the state director in effecting recoveries of assistance
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of the instant cases, but emphasized in others, include the absence of
prosecuting duties in the administrative trier, the judicial nature of the
proceedings within the agency, the independence of the agency from
political pressures, and any overriding policy considerations that are
presented by a particular case." While these matters are seldom
clearly articulated or discussed by the courts, some otherwise irrecon-
cilable decisions become meaningful when these factors are considered.
The present status of the law can be condensed to a statement that
the findings of fact by an administrative agency will not be disturbed
unless the evidence in the record preponderates against them, but
that application of principles of law is always said to be subject to
an independent judgment by the court. This area of the law is in a
relatively fluid state and is one in which policy considerations and
practical arguments are particularly persuasive, if not controlling,
due to the absence of stratified rules of law and procedure. Both
counsel and courts would do well to consider the problems involved in
the scope of judicial review when faced with advocating or determin-
ing an appeal to the courts from an administrative decision.
WnLIAm FRASER
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Right of Survivorship in Joint Tenancy Bank Accounts. In the
recent case of In re Webb's Estate,' the Supreme Court of Washington
held that if a married man and a single man together establish a joint
savings account with right of survivorship, the married man may take
the total sum on deposit upon the single man's predeceasing him.
However, a seeming inconsistency arose when the court intimated that
if the married man had predeceased the single man, the survivor's
rights would have been subject to the claims of community property.2
payments from exempt assets in the estates of deceased recipients may have given him
greater insight into the necessity of serving that purpose of the prohibition against
transfers in RCW 74.08.335.
16 For perhaps the most radical attempt by the Supreme Court to make these factors
crucial see Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). It is perhaps ironical that
this attempt to promote the decisive influence of practical considerations failed for
practical reasons. Primarily because of opposition from the tax bar and uneven appli-
cation by the circuit courts, the doctrine fell into ill repute and was repealed by statute
in 1949. The opinion retains its vitality, however, as an expression by the court of its
current feeling towards the whole problem of judicial review. The history of the
doctrine in our courts provides a suggestion of some of the limitations upon that
approach.
1 149 Wash. Dec. 6, 297 P.2d 948 (1956).
2 The same dictum appeared in Toivonen v. Toivonen, 196 Wash. 636, 84 P.2d 128
(1938).
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